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INTRODUCTION 
This article seeks to explore a simple but profound question: how should 
our legal system deal with the claims of animals for protection against harms 
inflicted by humans? Rather than a focus on pain and suffering or the 
cognitive abilities of animals, 1 this article will use the non-comparative 
approach based upon an interest analysis. The short answer is that our legal 
system can and should do what it always has done: balance the interests of 
competing individuals in a public policy context, always seeking to strike an 
ethically appropriate balance. The legislative branch of our government 
presently promotes the consideration of animal interests on this basis. This 
article examines how the legal system presently balances such interests and 
how common law judges could expand, in a forthright manner, the 
consideration of animals' interests. Finally, this article will suggest a more 
expansive consideration of animals' interests through the adoption of a new 
tort: intentional interference with a fundamental interest of an animal. 2 
I. THE CURRENT ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 
Early advocates of animal rights focused on the point that animals feel 
pain and can suffer.3 If the starting point of the discussion is "animals should 
I. See generally Gary L. Francione, Animals-Property or Persons, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS I 08, 115-20 (Cass R. Sun stein & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2004) (discussing unnecessary suffering); Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, 
All Animals are Not Equal: The Interface Between Scientific Knowledge and Legislation for 
Animal Rights, in id. at 175, 175-96 (discussing intelligence). 
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 3-4 (5th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter PROSSER]. 
!d. 
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the 
common law is marked by many cases of first impression in which the court has 
struck out boldly to create a new cause of action where none had been recognized 
before. The intentional infliction of mental suffering, the obstruction of the right to 
go where the plaintiff likes, the invasion ofthe right of privacy, the denial ofthe right 
to vote, the conveyance ofland to defeat a title, the infliction of prenatal injuries, the 
alienation of the affections of a parent, and injury to a person's reputation by entering 
the person in a rigged television contest, to name only a few instances, could not be 
fitted into any accepted classifications when they first arose, but nevertheless have 
been held to be torts. 
3. The roots ofthe moral debate are centuries old, with Jeremy Bentham perhaps being 
one of the key figures in the debate. See Jeremy Bentham, A Utilitarian View, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBUGATIONS 129-30 (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 1989) 
(basing consideration for animals not on their linguistic or rational capacities but on their 
capacity for suffering). This perspective was recently re-articulated in Cass R. Sunstein, The 
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not feel pain" then the nature of the debate cannot extend to animals that do 
not have the capacity to feel pain, as we understand it. Additionally, if the 
debate is limited to pain, there may be any number of interferences by humans, 
such as suffering, early death, and limiting mental development, which would 
not be considered within the legal arena. Likewise, if the starting point is self-
awareness, consciousness, or language skills, then those not meeting the 
standard cannot be within the legal arena. 4 There is no reason to limit the 
debate about how to accommodate the needs of animals within our legal 
system by constraining the initial parameters. Instead, the playing field should 
be as broad as possible, offering every animal the opportunity to make their 
case. 
The threshold for access to the arena should be whether an entity has 
"interests." This notion has at least two connotations. First, in both humans 
and dogs, for example, a being may "desire" an object or outcome, that is, 
have an interest in a car or a bone. Secondly, in humans and dogs, a being has 
an "interest" in living life in a supportive and protected environment, e.g., 
interests in not being beaten and in having access to potable water. This 
interest may never be specifically or consciously articulated in the brain of an 
individual, but through life experiences and the information provided by 
science it is understood to be present nevertheless. As used in this article, both 
aspects may apply, but the latter is the primary focus. However, only a limited 
number of these interests will ultimately be recognized and protected by the 
legal system. 
In the past decade there have been a number of books and articles that 
have urged significant change in how the legal system deals with animals. 5 
Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 387 (2003). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal 
Rights: The Need fora Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) (reviewing STEVEN 
M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS {2000) [hereinafter 
RATTLING THE CAGE] and overviewing the various basics for claims for animals). 
An interesting summary of views during the 1800's can be found in the first chapter of the 
first formal book advocating legal rights for animals. HENRY S. SALT, ANIMALS' RIGHTS: 
CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS {MacMillan & Co. 1894). The perspective of 
suffering and human mercy has been most recently considered in a book by MATTHEW Scuu. Y, 
DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO MERCY 
(2002). 
4. For a detailed consideration of animal awareness, from a key animal rights 
philosopher, see TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 34-81 { 1983 ). For an update on 
the science of animal awareness and consciousness, see RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 3, at 
119-62 and STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 
(2002) [hereinafter DRAWING THE LINE]. See also MARC BEKOFF, MINDING ANIMALS: 
AWARENESS, EMOTIONS, AND HEART {2002); THE COGNITIVE ANIMAL: EMPIRICAL AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMAL COGNITION (Marc Bekoff et al. eds., 2002). 
5. Professor Gary Francione has written extensively as an advocate for animal rights 
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Steven Wise has made a strong case for the allocation of legal rights for some 
animals on the basis of dignity rights such as liberty and equality. His "rights" 
jurisprudence is developed extensively in two books.6 The core of his 
approach suggests that common law judges have the inherent authority to 
extend some legal rights to animals. As at least some animals experience the 
world in ways that are similar to the way humans experience the world, any 
differences between them and us is one of degree and not of nature. Thus it 
follows that at least some fundamental legal rights familiar to us ought to 
extend to them as well. 7 Mr. Wise's writings do not suggest how to think 
about balancing human and animal rights when they are in conflict. His focus 
is on the triumphing capacity of the nonhuman's right to be free from 
enslavement of the person and the need to have bodily integrity. 
A significant limitation on this approach is that human characteristics 
become the measuring stick by which to judge the legal "oughts" for animals. 
Another problem is that it seems unlikely that the next movement in the legal 
system will be to grant any absolute rights to a group or species of animals. 
Instead, it is more likely that the next step will be to allow animal interests to 
compete more fully with human interests, sometimes winning and sometimes 
losing. 
Some writers, those promoting legal rights for animals, argue that a 
chasm exists between humans and animals which can be bridged only with the 
greatest effort, with a beach assault on the legal status quo. 8 On the one side 
in the legal community. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 
(1995). Another lawyer, Steven M. Wise, has also been an active scholar. See, e.g., Steven M. 
Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a 
Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REv. 793 (1998) (analyzing the development of"rights" in the 
common Jaw context and the justification of animals rights under a traditional "rights" 
framework). In the world of philosophy, Peter Singer and Tom Regan have long been visible 
advocates. See PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975); ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN 
OBUGATIONS, supra note 3. 
6. DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 4; RATTUNG THE CAGE, supra note 3. 
7. As noted by Steven Wise: 
"Practical autonomy" is not just what most humans have but what most judges think 
is sufficient for basic liberty rights, and it boils down to this: a being has practical 
autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic liberty rights if she: 
1. can desire; 
2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires; and 
3. possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that 
it is she who wants something and it is she who is trying to get it. 
DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 4, at 32. 
8. Professor Gary Francione has long rallied against the property status of animals and 
has stated that the treatment of animals will not significantly change until the property status 
of animals is eliminated. Part of the confusion that plagues the modern animal protection 
movement is connected to the failure to realize that rights theory, at its core, is the rejection of 
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of the river is the humanity and on the other side is the community of things, 
that community including animals. The river, the barrier between, is the 
property status of animals. These writers suggest that so long as animals are 
property, they will be excluded from our legal community.9 Additionally, the 
reform they suggest indicates that the legal community they envision is not the 
one of today, but a different one, one in which all people are vegans, and 
commercial use of animals is prohibited. 10 
To provide a way for animals to both cross the river of property status 
and to create this vision of a new human community simultaneously is not 
possible. It asks for revolution in a legal system that prefers evolution. To 
move from where we are today to this future legal community would indeed 
be bridging a wide chasm. But perhaps these animal advocates are looking in 
the wrong place to promote the interests of animals. Perhaps it is not as 
difficult as they believe;'' perhaps a shallower place to cross the river can be 
the property status of animals. Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: 
Relative Normative Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. 75, 100-0 I ( 1997). Other than suggesting that the 
property status should be eliminated, Professor Francione does not suggest exactly how, in a 
post property status world, the legal system would treat animals. In particular, he has not 
suggested how to balance the competing interests of humans and animals. 
9. Steven M. Wise, Animal Thing to Animal Person- Thought on Time, Place, and 
Theories, 5 ANIMALL. 61,61 (1999) 
(For centuries, a Great Legal Wall has divided humans from every other species of 
animal in the West. On one side, every human is a person with legal rights; on the 
other, every non-human is a thing with no legal rights. Every animal rights lawyer 
knows that this barrier must be breached.). 
On the other hand Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested that perhaps this wall is not so great. 
Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us About the Puzzle 
of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. I, 2 (200 I) ("[I]t is a myth ... that 
our legal and constitutional framework has never accorded rights to entities other than human 
beings and, therefore that a high wall must be breached or vaulted if rights are now to be 
accorded to non-human animals."). 
10. 
If we are serious about animal rights, we have a responsibility to stop bringing them 
into existence for our purposes. We would stop bringing all domestic animals into 
existence for human purposes .... We recognize that the most important step that 
any of us can take toward abolition [of the property status of animals] is to adopt the 
vegan lifestyle and to educate others about veganism. 
Interview by Lee Hall with Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law 
(Summer, 2002), at http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-with-
gary-francione.htrnl. 
II. 
The first lesson that our Constitution teaches is that rights are not such a scary thing 
to recognize or to confer, since rights are almost never absolute. Arguing for 
constitutional rights on behalf of non-human beings ... shouldn't be confused with 
giving certain non-human interests absolute priority over conflicting human claims. 
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found, not into some future legal community, but into the community of 
today. 12 
What if we took a step back from the demands of sweeping legal change? 
What if we could make progress for animals without eliminating their property 
status? What if we could make the legal argument on behalf of animals 
without demanding a showing that they are on equal footing with humans? Is 
there a place where the property concept is not a barrier to being a participant 
in the legal community of today? As will be shown, many animals have 
already found a series of stepping stones into our legal community; they are 
already quietly among us. 
II. AN INTEREST BASIS FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 
As a starting point we need a conceptual lens with which to view our 
present legal community. An "interests" lens provides the sharpest and most 
useful vision. One of the most luminous deans of Harvard Law School, Rosco 
Pound, set out a comprehensive analysis of this "lens" some fifty years ago. 
In his four volume set, Jurisprudence, Dean Pound used an interests analysis 
to explain the existence and operation of our legal system. 13 
He suggested a legal system is a necessary and natural outgrowth of 
social organization, arising out of the reality that individual humans within any 
society have conflicting interests with other individuals and society in 
general. 14 Further, "the law does not create these interests. It finds them 
pressing for recognition and security. "15 Basic to the existence of a society is 
the existence of systematic methods for dealing with conflicts. A mark of a 
Tribe, supra note 9, at 2. From a legal point of view, there is nothing at all new or unfamiliar 
about the idea of animal rights; on the contrary, it is entirely clear that animals have legal 
rights-at least a certain kind. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing For Animals (With Notes on Animal 
Rights), 47 UCLA L. REv. 1333, 1335 (2000). 
12. Some progress on behalf of animals can be made by modifying the concept of 
property ownership. By dividing title into legal and equitable components and then awarding 
equitable title to the animal, some degree of self-ownership can be allowed without destroying 
the acknowledged relationship with a human. See David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership For 
Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473 (2000). 
13. See generally, 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959). 
14. 
Conflicts or competition between interests arise because of the competition of 
individuals with each other, the competition of groups or associations or societies of 
men with each other, and the competition of individuals with such groups or 
associations or societies in the endeavor to satisfy human claims and wants and 
desires. 
!d. at 17. 
15. /d. at 21. 
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civilized society is the rejection of violence, or "might makes right," as a basis 
of social organization. Other mechanisms for dispute resolution, such as those 
that exist within religious communities, likewise have inherent limitations, and 
as such, are nevertheless held to the standards of the broader legal 
community. 16 
Within our legal context, what are these interests? Pound suggests that 
interests "may be defined as a demand or desire or expectation which human 
beings, either individually or in groups ... seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, 
the adjustment ofhuman relations and ordering of human behavior through the 
force of a politically organized society requires society must take account. " 17 
These interests can be both positive and negative. For example, humans have 
interests both in being free from the sensation of pain and in a desire to form 
families. Both of these interests are recognized and promoted within our legal 
system. 
If humans move through life with interests attached to them, then the job 
of the legal system is to act as referee between the conflicting interests. But, 
two considerations serve to limit the law's willingness to engage in a dispute. 
First, the legal system has limited resources and cannot address all disputes 
between individuals. Second, notwithstanding the assertions of any particular 
individual, some conflicts should not be resolved by the state. For example, 
Mr. Jones of Dominoes, Iowa may have an interest in marrying a wealthy, 
attractive woman who lives in his town. This interest is one best left to the 
individual, even if government resources existed to help Mr. Jones pursue this 
interest. In short, the legal system must sort out which interests deserve 
protection. Then, the legal system must develop the rules by which conflicts 
between qualifying, quarreling interests will be resolved. 
In the following sections, the role of the present-day legal system in 
sorting out and balancing conflicting interests will be considered. 18 This article 
first considers conflicts between humans, then conflicts with other species, and 
finally how our present system deals with some human, animal conflicts. This 
analysis will support the proposition that presently the interests of some 
animals are sometimes acknowledged as within the legal system. Building 
16. For example, the Catholic Church has been trying to deal with the issue of sexual 
abuse by priests within the community. Many are dissatisfied by how the Church has sought 
to balance the competing interests of the institution, the priest and the parishioners. See Justin 
Pope, New Revelations Could Topple Boston Cardinal, LANSING Sr. J., Dec. 8, 2002, at 7 A. 
Regardless ofhow the dispute is settled within the church, the individuals involved can demand 
accountability under the civil and criminal laws of the state. 
17. 3 POUND, supra note 13, at 16. The word "interests" is also a key phrase in the 
discussion of torts in the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement defines interests as "to denote 
the object of any human desire." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § I ( 1965). 
18. See 3 POUND, supra note 13, at 30-33. 
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upon the premise that it is ethically appropriate to address animal interests 
within the legal system, an additional approach, made available through the 
creation of a new tort, will be advocated. 19 
A. Human Interests in the Legal System 
Human beings have interests. Sometimes, many times, these interests are 
in conflict with the interests of other human beings. To help understand some 
of the complexities, consider Mr. Alpha Jones as an example. Mr. Jones has 
an interest in apple pies; he would love to have apple pie every day. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with this interest, and presumably he is free to fulfill 
this interest within the limitations of his culinary skill and personal resources. 
However, if he seeks to satisfy this interest by taking, without paying, an apple 
pie made by Sally Top, then his interest will be in conflict with Ms. Top's 
interest in either eating the pie herself or in receiving compensation for her 
labor and cost. 20 
Now the question becomes, is this conflict of interest of such a nature 
that the State, through its legal system, should intervene in the conflict? 
Human history suggests that protecting work product or invention is a critical 
component in keeping a peaceful society, and therefore, the law has adopted 
a series of rules/laws to deal with this conflict. The law says that Ms. Top's 
pie may not be taken physically from her unless she has made a gift or sale of 
it to another. IfMr. Jones violates this norm, then Ms. Top may either sue him 
for the return of the pie or its value and/or the State may press criminal charges 
for the theft. 
Mr. Jones may also have an interest in having a social date with Ms. Top. 
And again, Ms. Top's interest may be in conflict with Mr. Jones's interest. 
She may have an interest in being free from the attention ofMr. Jones. Should 
the law intervene in this conflict of interest? Assuming that this is a verbal 
exchange, then society has decided that there is no role for the legal system, 
that Mr. Jones and Ms. Top will normally resolve this conflict; indeed, 
thousands of times daily this conflict arises and is resolved without the 
intervention of the law.21 If, however, Mr. Jones decides to further his interest 
19. "The entire history of the development of tort law shows a continuous tendency to 
recognize as worthy of legal protection interests which previously were not protected at all." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § I cmt. e ( 1965). 
20. The author recognizes that this fact pattern promotes long held sexual stereotypes, 
and that the pie maker could as well be a male, but he cannot escape the reality that his wife's 
apple pies are simply superior to all others. 
21. 
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all human wrongs. 
The obvious limitations upon the time of the courts, the difficulty in many cases of 
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by inappropriately touching or grabbing Ms. Top, or perhaps by calling her 
and following her for days on end, he has exceeded the norms of social 
conduct. He has interfered with her liberty rights. In such a case, the legal 
system provides recourse for Ms. Top, so her interests are protected. The 
recourse would be in the form of criminal charges for battery or stalking or a 
civil action seeking an injunction against further intrusion of her privacy.22 
What if, as Mr. Jones left the home ofMs. Top, he stepped on her dog 
Floppy, 23 breaking the dog's back? Now Mr. Jones has engaged in conduct that 
runs counter to the interests of two beings, Ms. Top and Floppy. Ms. Top has 
an emotional attachment to Floppy, such that to harm Floppy would inflict 
harm upon Ms. Top. Floppy has the interest of being free from the infliction 
of pain and suffering by others. In this case, the response of the legal system 
is less than straightforward. 
Floppy's interest to be free from pain has been long recognized in the 
United States. Protection from interference with this interest, although 
significantly qualified, exists in every state's criminal anti -cruelty provisions. 24 
This would appear to give Floppy a legal right enforceable by the state.25 But 
the decision to proceed against Mr. Jones is up to the local prosecutor; Floppy 
has no direct legal remedy, as of yet. On the other hand, Ms. Top's interest in 
not having her pet, with whom she has considerable attachment, harmed is 
only partly protected. Most states would limit any recovery in a civil suit to the 
market or replacement value of the dog, unless she is within the scope of a tort 
known as the "intentional infliction of emotional distress. "26 Thus, the legal 
ascertaining the real facts or of providing any effective remedy, have meant that there 
must be some selection of those more serious injuries which have the prior claim to 
redress and are dealt with most easily. Trivialities must be left to other means of 
settlement, and many wrongs which in themselves are flagrant-ingratitude, avarice, 
broken faith, brutal words, and heartless disregard of the feelings of others-are 
beyond any effective legal remedy, and any practical administration of the law. 
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 23. 
22. For example, in June of2003, the actress Sandra Bullock obtained an injunction 
against a Michigan man which prohibited any contact of her by him. He had sought to contact 
her for eighteen months by voice mail, fax and phone calls. Newsmakers, LANSING ST. J., June 
8, 2003, at 2A. 
23. Yes, another example of stereotyping by the author. Ms. Top might have a German 
Shepard who is called Bruno. 
24. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
25. Some might argue that it is not a legal right unless it is enforceable by the 
individual. However, if a right can represent a restraint on the actions of others, then whether 
it is enforced by the government or private action should not make a definitional difference, 
even though there may well be significant practical differences. See Sunstein, supra note 11, 
at 1342-59. 
26. See also http://www.animallaw.info/topicslspuspetdamages.htrn; see generally, 
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system has a rich assortment of responses for interference with a diversity of 
human interests, but much less when the harm is to the interests of an animal. 
B. Animal Interests-Endangered Species 
The legal system of the United States has shown the flexibility to allow 
for the protection of interests beyond or in addition to human interests. A 
prime example of this arose in the early 1970s as part of the environmental 
movement. It was recognized at the time that human activities were placing 
groups of living entities, clustered under the term "species," at risk of 
extinction.27 The federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was adopted to 
address these concerns.28 This law acknowledges this group interest in 
continued biological (and ecological) existence and seeks to protect that 
interest from human intrusion through conservation of the species. 29 
As a corporation is a conceptual tool or framework for the representation 
of a group of humans, a "species" is a conceptual way to address the interests 
Geordie Duckier, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological 
Argument for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199 (2002); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving 
Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets' Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a 
Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (200 I); Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and 
Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 
47 (2002); William C. Root, "Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An 
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages 
Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 41 VILL L. REv. 423 (2002). 
27. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (2000). 
Congressional findings and declaration of purposes and policy 
(a) Findings. The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) various species offish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been 
rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development 
untempered by adequate concern and conservation; 
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in numbers 
that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction; 
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people .... 
§ 1531(a). 
28. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified in 
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544). 
29. "It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and 
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act." § 1531 (c). "The terms 'conserve,' 
'conserving,' and 'conservation' mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which 
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the 
measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary." § 1532(3). Concern for 
animals also arises with other federal laws. See Sunstein, supra note II, at 1339-40. 
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of a group of individual animals. A species's interests, like a corporation's 
interests, are derivative of the members of which it is composed. A species has 
no moral claim upon us; rather it is the interests of individual animals that 
assert their claim upon us. 30 But knowing and tracking individual wild animals 
is difficult at best and it is simply easier to deal with a group without seeking 
to identify specific individuals. Thus, humans may not be particularly 
compelled by the claim of any one animal for its continued life, but become 
compelled when an entire group of individuals face extinction. As the number 
of individuals decrease, and risk of extinction increases, then we adjust the 
balance of interests, giving trumping power to the continuation and recovery 
of the species over a number of human interests. This re-balancing of the 
interests was captured in the ESA. 
The majority ofU.S. environmental laws adopted in the same time period 
seek to balance the interests of humans to be free from the harmful effects of 
pollution and the need for allowing economic and other human activity.31 But 
when it comes to species preservation, there is no balancing of this interest 
with human economic needs. Species are listed on the endangered or 
threatened list on the basis of scientific criteria, not a risk-benefit or public 
health analysis. 32 Once a species is listed, government and private actions that 
harm the species are limited. Under the ESA, the conservation of a listed 
species supercedes almost all human interests, including economic, religious, 
sport hunting and food gathering. 33 Clearly the law gives the executive branch 
30. In an abstract sense species represent information-genetic, biological and 
ecological-which humans might find useful. But moral claims can attach only to individual 
living entities. Likewise, a corporation, however useful to organizing human activities, has no 
claim in the moral arena. For a general discussion of nature of corporations, see HARRY G. 
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
144-52 (West 1983). But the corporation is not a natural entity. It is an artifactual entity 
recognized and protected by the state. The state endows it with many of the same rights that 
individuals have, but does so for instrumental ends. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 
285 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995). 
31. Like FIFRA [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act], TSCA [Toxic 
Substance Control Act] is known as a balancing law, invoking the noncommittal language of 
"unreasonable risk" no less than thirty-eight times in a statute of sixty-four pages. WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 489 (1994). The Clean Air Act uses human health as the 
starting point for standards, but ultimately the administrator must define some level of risk as 
acceptable. /d. at 156-64. 
32. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2005). 
3 3. The Endangered Species Committee, 16 U. S.C. § 1536( e )-(h) (2000)(known as the 
"God" Committee), has the authority to grant exemptions from the requirements of 
§ 1536(a)(2}-protecting critical habitat, and prohibiting actions "likely to jeopardize" a species. 
This committee is allowed to balance the benefits of a proposed activity against the harm or risk 
of harm the project represents. One of the concessions that the environmental organizations 
were able to obtain during the drafting process in Congress was a requirement that the 
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the power to assert these species' interests against human activities when the 
law is violated. Perhaps even more importantly, private individuals, under 
citizen suit provisions, have been allowed to assert the specie's interests both 
against the government itself and other private individuals. 34 
In the early development of environmental law, it was suggested that the 
ecological grouping of living and non-living entities might be combined 
together to support standing in the courts for environmental issues. Justice 
Douglas, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 35 suggested that perhaps ecological entities 
such as rivers and forests could be ecological "plaintiffs" whose interest might 
come before the Court in its consideration of human actions impacting the 
natural environment. 36 While this idea was proposed in some detail in an 
article by Professor Christopher Stone/7 and in tum utilized by Justice 
Douglas, the Supreme Court has not pursed this path in subsequent opinions. 
Committee be composed of high profile individuals who could not delegate their responsibility 
to agency employees. See§ 1536(e)(3) (listing the composition of the Committee). 
Until 1991, only two applications for exemptions had been filed, both denied by the 
Committee. In 1991, the Administration found itself in the hot seat with the spotted owl 
controversy. Perhaps realizing that amending the act was not a realistic option in the short term, 
the government sought the blessing of the "God" Committee to continue to cut down the 
public's old growth forest for the benefit of the timber industry. Notice of Exemption 
Application, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,548 (Sept. 25, 1991 ). See Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption 
Process under the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 825 (1991 ). 
34. 
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence a 
civil suit on his own behalf-{A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and 
any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in 
violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority 
thereof .... 
16 U.S. C. § 1540(g)( I)( A) (2000). For an example of a private party suing another private party 
for the protection of the interests of a species, see Coho Salmon v. Pacific Lumber Company, 
61 F. Supp. 2d I 00 I (N.D. Cal. 1999). Defendant's timber operations were polluting the 
streams used by the endangered salmon. !d. at 1005. The court held that the plaintiffs had 
standing under the ESA to assert the protection of the law for the salmon. /d. at 1015. 
35. 405 u.s. 727 (1972). 
36. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,741-52 (1972). 
37. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects 45 CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972) (subsequently incorporated into the book 
CHRJSTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, 
MORALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT ( 1996)). 
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C. Individual Animals 
Finally, and most importantly, the following are examples of situations 
in which our legal system acknowledges animal interests for some purposes, 
for some animals, notwithstanding their status as property. These examples are 
from three diverse areas of law: criminal law, civil law and administrative 
law. 
1. Anti-Cruelty Laws 
The first beachhead for all animals, on the shores of our legally relevant 
community of beings, was in the area of criminal law. From early in the 19th 
Century into the 1870s there was a clear transition in the laws dealing with 
animals from mere protection of the property interests of owners, to concern 
about the animals themselves.38 A 1867 New York law, promoted by Henry 
Bergh, founder of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, represents the conceptual breakthrough.39 Thereafter, many states 
adopted new laws based on the New York model.40 The existence of these 
laws clearly reflects the legislature's acceptance of the proposition that an 
38. See generally David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws 
During the 1800's, 1993 DET. C.L. REv. I. An example of a statute that reflects the strict 
property concept of animals, which existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, is found 
in Vermont law, stating in part: 
Every person who shall wilfully and maliciously kill, wound, maim or disfigure any 
horse, or horses, or horse kind, cattle, sheep or swine, of another person, or shall 
wilfully or maliciously administer poison to any such animal ... shall be punished 
by imprisonment [of] ... not more than five years, or fined not exceeding five 
hundred dollars .... 
1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves 34.2. In this language there is no provision prohibiting the cruel 
treatment of animals. The list of animals protected was limited to commercially valuable 
animals, not pets or wild animals. The purpose ofthis law was to protect commercially valuable 
property from the interference of others, not to protect animals from pain and suffering. Finally, 
since the penalty was for up to five years of jail time, a violation of this law was a felony. 
39. See generally Favre & Tsang, supra note 38, at 14-18. 
40. Within a few years, Massachusetts (An Act for the More Effectual Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 344 (1869)), Pennsylvania (XXIV PA. STAT. §§ 
7770-7783 (1920)), Illinois (Prevention ofCrueltyto Animals Act, 1869 Ill. Laws§ 3), New 
Hampshire (1878 N.H. LAWS 281), and New Jersey (N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 64-82 (1873)) had 
adopted the same pattern of legislation as that in New York, with both new crimina\ laws and 
the charted creations of state Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ("S.P.C.A."). 
As of 1890, thirty-one states had some level of organized Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, 1890 ANNuAL 
REPORT 36. See generally, RICHARD D. RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION: CHANGING ATTITUDES 
TOWARDSPECIESISM 171-75 (1989). 
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animal's interest to be free from unnecessary pain and suffering should be 
recognized in the legal system. 
This new proposition was also recognized by the courts of the time. In 
Stephens v. State,41 the court found that, "[t]his statute is for the benefit of 
animals, as creatures capable of feeling and suffering, and it was intended to 
protect them from cruelty, without reference to their being property, or to the 
damages which might thereby be occasioned to their owners. "42 This point 
was also made in an Arkansas case where the court acknowledged this new 
concern when it noted that the new laws 
are not made for the protection of the absolute or relative rights of persons, or the 
rights of men to the acquisition and enjoyment of property, or the peace of society. 
They seem to recognize and attempt to protect some abstract rights in all that animate 
creation ... from the largest and noblest to the smallest and most insignificant.43 
These laws clearly reflect society's acknowledgment that animals have 
interests in being free from pain and suffering. 
It must also be recognized that the early laws also sought to balance these 
newly acknowledged animal interests with human interests. The laws 
recognized that sometimes human interests will supercede those of the 
animals', and pain and suffering might occur. Within the original New York 
law, this balancing existed. The critical prohibitions on beating and killing 
animals are modified by "unnecessarily" and "needlessly. "44 Thus, if a horse 
has to be hit to make him start pulling the wagon, or if an animal has to be 
killed to be eaten, such actions do not violate the law. Another clear balancing 
of interests occurs in the context of scientific experimentation. Section 10 of 
the 1867 New York law provided that properly conducted scientific 
experiments do not violate the law, thus allowing intentional infliction of pain 
and suffering for the advancement of scientific knowledge. 45 A key limitation 
41. 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1888). 
42. Stephens v. State, 3 So. 458 (Miss. 1888). 
43. Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456,458 (1881). 
44. 1867N.Y.ANTI-CRUELTYLAWch. 375 §I (1867)(currentversionatN.Y.AGRIC. 
& MKTS. LAW§ 353 (Consol. 2004)) (penalty for overdriving, cruelly treating animals, etc.). 
/d. 
If any person shall overdrive, overload, torture, torment, deprive of necessary 
sustenance, or unnecessarily or cruelly beat, or needlessly mutilate or kill. or 
cause or procure to be overdrive, overloaded, tortured, tormented or deprived of 
necessary sustenance, or to be unnecessarily or cruelly beaten, or needlessly 
mutilated, or killed as aforesaid any living creature, every such offender shall, 
for every such offence, be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
45. § 10. 
Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with any 
properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations, which experiments shall 
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of criminal cruelty laws is the extensive, broad list of exemptions built into the 
law. As will be developed later in this article, this balancing of interests will 
be a part of crafting into the proposed new tort for animals, though without 
the historical exemptions. 
2. Federal Animal Welfare Act 
The federal government's concern over animal welfare issues did not 
arise until almost one hundred years after the adoption of the New York laws. 
The federal Animal Welfare Act ("AWA")46 was adopted in 1967. A key 
difference of the federal law, when compared with the prior state laws, is that 
the A W A was intended primarily as a regulatory scheme, rather than a 
criminal law one. Initially the language of the law was limited to creating a 
license system and assuring that some mammals were housed and cared for in 
an appropriate manner.47 
Acknowledgment of animal interests expanded with the 1985 
Amendments to the A W A.48 Within these provisions, for the first time in 
United States law, the mental well-being, rather than just the physical well-
being of a primate, was recognized and guarded. The law now requires all 
holders of primates under the jurisdiction of the A W A to have "a physical 
environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being ofprimates.'"'9 
There is no balancing this interest with human interests; it is an unmodified, 
unlimited requirement for the housing of primates. This provision is as close 
to a trump card as any group of animals has received in our legal system. 
However, it must be noted that the implementation of this requirement has 
been a slow process that has not yet been fully realized. 50 
/d. 
be perfonned only under the authority of the faculty of some regularly incorporated 
medical college or university of the state of New York. 
46. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000). Available with full legal history at 
www.animallaw.info/statutes/stusawa.htm. 
4 7. H.R. 13881, 89th Con g. ( 1966)( enacted) (No criminal law provisions are included, 
but animal "dealers" need to have a license to sell animals to research facilities.). 
48. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985) (codified at 
7 U.S.C. §§ 2151-59); see also Sunstein, supra note II, at 1340-42. 
49. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B). 
SO. The USDA has developed regulations to deal with this issue. See 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 
(2004 ). A number of books, for example, HOUSING, CARE AND PSHYCHOWGICAL WELL BEING 
OF CAPTIVE AND LABORATORY PRIMATES (Evalyn F. Segal ed., 1989), a number of law suits, 
for example, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and 
many conferences have been held over the past decade to more fully develop how this legal 
obligation should be carried out. 
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Another aspect of the 1985 amendments focused specifically on the 
scientific experiments themselves changing the balance of interests struck in 
the 1867 New York law and the 1967 version of the A W A. Now there is a 
federally imposed duty both to minimize the pain during the experiment and 
to provide pain management after the experiment. 51 The A W A represents a 
clear example of our legislative process adopting a law seeking to strike a 
balance between the interests ofhumans and animals. 
3. Chimpanzee Protection Act 
Another example at the federal level deals specifically with our genetic 
cousins, the chimpanzee. In 2000, Congress passed the Chimpanzee Health 
Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act. 52 The issue before Congress 
was what should be done for or with the more than one thousand long-living 
chimpanzees that had been part of the U.S. federal research system for many 
years, but were no longer needed for research. A special committee of the 
National Research Council looked into the issue and found that continued lab 
housing for chimpanzees would have been expensive, particularly when the 
animal was no longer actively part of research. 53 The cheapest alternative 
would have been to euthanize the unneeded animals, though this option was 
rejected by the Committee, and ultimately by Congress as well. The option 
suggested by the Research Committee and adopted by Congress was the 
creation of retirement sanctuaries that would be operated and partly supported 
by Congress and non-profit private organizations. 54 
51. Congress directed the USDA that the adopted regulations should provide: 
(A) for animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental procedures to ensure that 
animal pain and distress are minimized, including adequate veterinary care with the 
appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizing drugs, or euthanasia; 
(B) that the principal investigator considers alternatives to any procedure likely to 
produce pain to or distress in an experimental animal. 
7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3). 
52. 42 U.S. C. § 287a-3a (2000). 
53. At the time of the adoption of the law, CNN reported that existing laboratory 
housing for chimpanzees was $20-$30 dollars per day, while it was expected that a sanctuary 
would cost $8 to $15 per day. Senate Approves Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 7, 
2000, at http://www.archives.cnn.com/2000/NA TURE/12/07 /laboratory.animals.ap. "We can 
estimate that the direct cost for chimpanzee support now being paid from multiple government 
budgets is $7,300,000 per year." COMM. ON LoNG-TERM CARE OF CHIMPANZEES, INST. FOR 
LAB. ANIMAL RESEARCH COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, CHIMPANZEES IN RESEARCH: STRATEGIES 
FOR THEIR ETHICAL CARE, MANAGEMENT, AND USE 53-54 (1997) [hereinafter NRC REPORT), 
available at http://bob.nap.edu/ html/chimp/. 
54. 
The committee believes that funds for long-term care of chimpanzees, especially the 
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While money was one motivation for Congress's action, underlying the 
passage of the Chimpanzee Protection Act was also the recognition that 
chimpanzees used in research are morally relevant beings, toward whom our 
society, having used them for human benefit, has obligations. However, the 
political/Congressional record does not have any clear statement about moral 
philosophy. The record dances around the issue of why the chimpanzees are 
the focus of such concern. While some Congressmen objected to the law, 
saying that Congress should be addressing more important human issues, such 
a human heath care, no one on the record even hinted at killing chimpanzee as 
an alternative. 55 On the other hand, no congressperson took the opportunity 
to make the case for animal rights. The clearest statement was given by 
Senator Smith of New Hampshire who said, "(i]n other words, because 
chimpanzees and humans are so similar, those who work directly in 
chimpanzee research would find it untenable to continue using these animals 
if they were to be killed at the conclusion of the research. "56 Thus, it is not his 
moral position, but the moral concerns of others that support the legislation. 
Congressman Brown of Ohio stated in the floor debate, "[t)here is a moral 
responsibility for the long-term care of chimpanzees that are used for our 
benefit in scientific research and today that responsibility is ours. "57 
phase when they are no longer needed for research or breeding, should not come from 
biomedical research budgets, and it urges that creative approaches to develop and 
support sanctuaries be sought. Societal obligations to chimpanzees no longer needed 
forresearch or breeding require cooperative support from federal agencies, Congress, 
commercial companies, and nongovernment organizations. 
NRC REPORT, supra note 53, at 59-60. 
55. For example, Congressman Brown of Ohio stated: 
While I am pleased that we are passing legislation that illustrates a sensitivity to and 
responsibility for chimpanzees after they are no longer needed for research, I cannot 
understand why we are unable to demonstrate this level of responsiveness to 
Medicare beneficiaries or consumers of managed care plans who have asked us to 
address their concerns about health care. 
146 CONG. REc. HI0,554 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown). 
56. 146 CONG. REC. S ll ,654, II ,655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000)(statement ofSen. Smith). 
57. 146 CONG. REc. H10,554 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2000) (statement of Rep. Brown). 
It is the author's observation that for elected members of Congress, this proposal presented 
issues difficult for them to address openly. It would not be good politics to say in public you 
want to kill the chimpanzee, for that would most likely not resonate well with the average voter 
who, through the efforts of Jane Goodall and others, holds the chimpanzee as a special species. 
On the other hand, members of Congress cannot publicly say that they think chimpanzees are 
morally relevant beings for fear ofbeing cast by political opponents as animal rights supporters, 
as animal rights are not yet supported by the mainstream American voter. 
Another tension unstated in the public discussion was that the politicians did not want to 
criticize the medical research industry, which has strong political support generally. Yet, it was 
understood that moving the chimpanzee out of laboratory cages and into a sanctuary would 
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Under the Chimpanzee ~rotection Act, Congress required that 
regulations adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services have a 
provision requiring that "none of the chimpanzees may be subjected to 
euthanasia, except as in the best interest of the chimpanzee involved. "58 
Congress weighed the fundamental interests of the chimpanzees in having 
continued life against the cost to the taxpayers in supporting their continued 
life, and decided the chimpanzees' interests are greater. 59 
This action by Congress is representative of incremental legal change on 
behalf of animals. 60 Note that nobody suggested a retirement home for all of 
the rats that have been used in scientific studies and are no longer needed. 
Rather, the law represents what is politically and financially feasible at a 
moment in time. If this works, then perhaps this model can be expanded to 
other species in the future. 
4. Trusts & Estates 
An example of increased recognition of animal interests in the civil law 
arena is the Uniform Trust Act of 2000,61 which has been adopted in over a 
significantly enhance the quality of their lives. To talk about this as a justification for the new 
law would raise issues about why the medical research industry finds it necessary to keep 
chimpanzees in such repressive conditions to begin with. 
Thus the recorded debate is rather silent on the underlying motivations for the Act. 
Additionally, the Act itself does not have any preliminary language suggesting the motivations 
for the law. However, if it was not the case that there was moral concern for the plight of the 
chimpanzees, then it is difficult to see how the bill would have made it through the 
congressional labyrinth. See generally S. REP. No. 106-494 (2000); 146 CONG. REc. S 11 ,654-
55 (dailyed. Dec. 6, 2000); 146 CoNG. REc. H10,550-54 (dailyed. Oct. 24, 2000); Biomedical 
Research: Protecting Surplus Chimpanzee: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Health 
and Environment, 1 06th Cong. 109 (May 18, 2000). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(d)(2)(1) (2000). It should be noted that regulations have yet 
to be adopted. 
59. This position did have its dissenters: 
The minority view is that euthanasia is also an appropriate strategy for maximizing 
the quality of life of the remaining population while facilitating the continued 
production of chimpanzees to fulfill critical needs in biomedical and behavioral 
research when faced with limited financial resources and lack of adequate alternative 
facilities. 
NRC REPORT, supra note 53, at 88. 
60. The United States is not alone in advancing the legal status of chimpanzees. In 
1999, New Zealand amended its Animal Welfare Act to ban the use of non-human hominids in 
medical research unless it was for the benefit of the animal. See Rowan Taylor, A Step at a 
Time: New Zealand's Progress Toward Hominid Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35 (2001). 
61. UNIF. TRUST CODE (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/biVulc/ 
uta/2001 final. pdf. 
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dozen states. 62 With this adoption, another long-standing legal barrier has been 
lowered for animals. The river has been forded. The traditional view in the 
United States prevented animals from being the lawful subject of a provision 
in a will or trust.63 This inability of individuals to make provisions for their 
pets after their deaths was addressed by the drafters of the Uniform Trust Law 
with the drafting of section 408. Under this section, a trust for the care of an 
animal is specifically allowed and courts are likewise authorized to appoint 
someone to enforce the trust.64 Similar language has also been made part of 
the Uniform Probate Law.65 Thus, animals become legally relevant beings, 
with income and assets that must be protected and accounted for within the 
legal system. 
This change of legal status has occurred in that most traditional of legal 
areas-trust and estates. Moreover, this change is of a different quality than the 
prior examples. In this case, government action is not required for the interests 
of an animal to be asserted in the legal system. The civil courts have authority 
to act on behalf of animals. While the primary motivation may well have been 
62. See ALASKA STAT.§ 13.12.907 (Michie2004);ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 14-2907 (2004); 
CAL. PROB. CODE§ 15212 (West 2005); CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 15-11-901 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 
§ 73 7.116 (2002); IOWA CODE§ 633.2109 (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 700.2722 (2000); 1995 
MONT. CODE ANN.§ 72-2-1017 (2005); 2001 NEV. REV. STAT. 163-0075 (2001); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 38:11-38 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2-907 (1995); N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS LAW§ 7.8.1 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 36A-147 (1995); OR. REV. STAT.§ 128.308 
(2001); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 35-15-408 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-2-1001 (1998); WASH. 
REv. CODE§ 11.1118 (2004). 
63. See generally, Gerry W. Beyer Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Humans 
Die? 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 617 (2000); Siobhan Morrissey, Wills Go to the Dogs, ABAJ., 
May 2003, at 24. 
64. Trust for Care of Animal: 
(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the 
settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death ofthe animal or, ifthe trust was 
created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's 
lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. 
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed in the 
terms ofthe trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. 
A person having an interest in the welfare of the animal may request the court to 
appoint a person to enforce the trust or to remove a person appointed. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408. 
65. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 ( 1993 ). 
A trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The trust 
terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. A governing instrument 
shall be liberally construed to bring the transfer within this subsection, to presume 
against the merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition and to carry out the 
general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the 
transferor's intent. 
ARIZ. REv. STAT.§ 14-2907(8) (1994). 
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to take care of human concerns, legislatures adopting the Uniform Law and 
associated state statutes apparently did not have any conceptual difficulty with 
the accommodation of animals into the existing legal community. 
III. INTEREST RECOGNITION: A NEW TORT FOR ANIMALS 
The prior four examples support the position that animal interests are 
already acknowledged by our legal system, and therefore that animals are 
within our legal community. In particular, it should be noted that these points 
of legal recognition have occurred while animals have retained their property 
status. Property status is not a barrier to the recognition and protection of 
interests within our legal system. 66 As the above examples suggest, our 
legislatures have exercised their authority to expand the presence of animal 
interests within our legal system; now it is time to consider the potential role 
of our common law courts. 
Because of the limited scope of the A W A and Chimpanzee Protection 
Act, as well as the exceptions and limitations of criminal cruelty laws, more 
needs to be done on behalf of animals. 67 While the legislative route is always 
available, state courts represent an untapped resource that might be used on 
behalf of animals. These traditional courts have the capacity to expand the 
legal recognition of animal interests in the civil law arena. 68 In order to give 
form and substance to the judicial approach, the adoption of a new tort- the 
intentional interference with the primary interests of an animal-is hereby 
66. For an approach which transforms the nature of the property relationship without 
eliminating it, see Favre, supra note 12. This balancing of interests is rejected by Professor 
Francione as a wrong road to take in pursuing animal rights. 
Any version of animal welfare requires that we balance human and animal 
interests .... As I have argued throughout this book, this balancing process is at the 
root of the problem: it explains why animals are so ruthlessly exploited despite social 
norms that reject inhumane treatment, for as long as animals are regarded as property 
under the law, virtually any attempt to balance interests will entail an unavoidable 
devaluation of animal interests simply because they are property. 
FRANCIONE,supra note 5, at 257. 
67. See generally, SCULLY supra note 3. Just as one example, he discusses the horrors 
faced by animals in the agriculture segment of our society. 
68. The flexible power of the common law state courts is developed extensively in 
RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 3, at 89-118. While his discussion is in the context of 
developing rights, it applies also to the concepts of interests recognition. See PROSSER supra 
note 2, at 17-20. 
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urged.69 This tort would allow for the resolution of conflicts between human 
and a limited number of animal interests. 70 
Under this cause of action, the plaintiff must show the following 
elements: 
1. That an interest is of fundamental importance to the plaintiff animal; 
2. That the fundamental interest has been interfered with or harmed by the actions 
or inactions of the defendant; 
3. That the weight and nature of the interests of the animal plaintiff substantially 
outweighs the weight and nature of the interests of the human defendant. 
Before discussing the elements of the tort in more detail, three examples 
will be provided, allowing the reader to have a context in which to understand 
what the tort seeks to accomplish. All three will deal with a hypothetical 
chimpanzee - JoJo. 
#1- JoJo lives in the Potsville Zoo. He is one of a group of ten 
chimpanzees on a three-acre track that was part of a $6 million project the zoo 
built three years ago. Zoo visitors can see the chimpanzees from five viewing 
positions, though chimpanzees have the ability to retreat out of view if they 
wish. There is a trained caregiver on duty ten hours a day. The caregiver has 
the obligation to observe the chimpanzees for medical needs, to provide them 
with creative food gathering challenges, to assure that their individual 
interactions do not cause harm, to control humans, and to generally assure their 
well being. George Hall, an attorney, files a lawsuit on behalf of client JoJo, 
claiming that regardless of the size of the cage, JoJo is still not able to move 
about in as large an area as he would in nature, and that the confinement 
interferes with his fundamental interest in personal freedom. Under the 
elements of the new tort, the court would not rule for JoJo with these facts. 
While assuming that personal freedom may be a fundamental interest, the zoo 
has provided an environment which allows significant exercise of the interest 
of freedom of movement. Therefore, the plaintiff will not be able to show a 
substantial interference with a fundamental interest. 
69. The tort proposed in this article could be legislatively adopted. Over the next decade 
it is more likely that legislatures will proceed on a more modest point by point basis. Perhaps 
the A WA could be amended to outlaw the use of primates in invasive research. For an example 
ofhow the balance of competing human-animal interests could be re-balanced, see David Favre, 
Laboratory Animal Act: A Legislative Proposal, 3 PACE ENVTLL. REv. 123 (1986). 
70. 
The first thing that our Constitution teaches is that rights are not such a scary thing 
to recognize or to confer, since rights are almost never absolute. Arguing for 
constitutional rights on behalf of non-human being[ s] ... shouldn't be confused with 
giving certain non-human interests absolute priority over conflicting human claims. 
Tribe, supra note 9, at 2. 
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#2-JoJo lives in the basement of the home of Big Jones in a commercial 
5 X 5 X 7 cage. Big Jones collects exotic animals and shows off JoJo to all his 
beer-drinking friends by banging on the cage to get a reaction out of JoJo. 
After several months in re~idence, JoJo no longer reacts to cage rattling and 
has cut back on eating the table scraps that Big Jones feeds him. This comes 
to the attention of attorney George Hall, who brings an action for JoJo under 
this tort seeking a guardianship for JoJo and an injunction requiring the 
transfer of JoJo to better facilities. The first two elements of the tort are easily 
satisfied. The fundamental interests of JoJo are clearly at risk; no 
socialization, no physical exercise, no enrichment of the environment, lack of 
appropriate food and clear psychological abuse. He is basically a live trophy 
for Big Jones. Therefore, the court will move to the third element: whether the 
interests of JoJo substantially outweigh the interests of Big Jones. The 
interests of Big Jones are personal; he has a modest financial investment in the 
animal and he feels important as the center of attention within his community 
of friends. It makes him feel special, providing part of his self-identity and 
self-esteem. The interests of Big Jones can be fulfilled other ways and do not 
justify this degree of interference with JoJo's fundamental interests. Jones's 
property interest in JoJo is not a defense. The court should be willing to enjoin 
the continued possession of JoJo by Big Jones. Because of the harm caused 
by Jones, the court could award damages or require the title transfer of JoJo to 
a third party without compensation. 
#3- As a final example, consider JoJo, having lived for twenty years in 
an institutional lab at Big University, in a cage that meets the requirements of 
the AWA in physical dimensions.71 However, he never sees the natural light 
of the sun, or feels the touch of any other chimpanzee, human or other, unless 
handlers have sought to do a procedure with him. There is nothing for him to 
do in the cage. He has been part of three different scientific protocols over the 
past fifteen years. If attorney George Hall brings an action for violation ofthe 
tort and seeks removal of JoJo from this environment, it should not be too 
difficult to show intentional interference with his fundamental interests as 
discussed above. The legal focus would quickly tum to element three and the 
court would have to determine whether JoJo's interests clearly outweigh the 
interests of the owner, Big University, in utilizing this animal in the name of 
science. This is not an abstract argument about the use of animals in science; 
instead, the dispute will be about this particular chimpanzee being used by this 
particular university. Whereas, in the past, researchers have only had to justify 
the use of chimpanzees to themselves, and did not have to give any weight to 
71. See 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 (2004). 
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the interests of the animal. Under the proposed tort, Big University would 
have to make its case to a court. 
A. A Legal Duty Generally 
Fundamental to the concept of a tort is the creation/existence of a duty 
obligating one being to take into consideration the interests of another. 72 It is 
the role of the common law courts to determine whether a particular asserted 
interest will be accepted, resulting in the imposition of a legal duty upon others 
to accommodate the newly asserted interest. As moral perspectives change 
and society evolves, courts find that duties exist where none existed before. 73 
In this case, the claimed duty is that of humans to not interfere with the 
fundamental interests of an animal unless they are asserting a more important, 
human-focused interest. 74 While this may seem novel and unsupportable to 
some, it is a duty that has long been in existence, though it has been owed to 
the government rather than the animal. As discussed previously, 75 for over one 
hundred years our criminal law, adopted in every state of the union, has 
imposed on humans a duty to not inflict pain and suffering on animals without 
justification, as well as an affirmative duty of care for animals within 
someone's possession and control. 76 The proposed tort simply allows 
recognition of a comparable duty within the civil legal system. 77 
72. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 4. "[l]t has been said that torts consist of the breach 
of duties fixed and imposed by upon the parties by the law itself, without regard to their 
consent .... " ld. 
73. See supra note 2. 
74. "So far as there is one central idea, it would seem that it is that liability must be 
based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts 
is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others." PROSSER supra note 2, at 
6. 
Much of the footnoted materials use terms such as "others" or "persons." Most often the 
author does not specifically contemplate animals being included under the umbrella of such 
terms. For a discussion of how to stretch these terms to include animals, see Mary Midge, 
Persons and Non Persons, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 53 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). 
75. See sources cited supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. 
76. For a survey of the state laws see, Pamela D. Frasch, et al., State Animal Anti-
Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69 (1999). 
77. 
A crime is an offense against the public at large, for which the state, as the 
representative of the public, will bring proceedings in the form of a criminal 
prosecution. The purpose of such a proceeding is to protect and vindicate the 
interests of the public as a whole, by punishing, by eliminating the offender from 
society. 
The civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is commenced and maintained by 
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This is but a logical next step. It is the well-being of the animal that is the 
focus of concern in the first place, so why not tie the duty directly to the being 
that deserves the protection and consideration? This will make the 
implementation of the duty more efficient. As might be presumed, any number 
of reasons arise which make it difficult for the government, through the offices 
of local prosecuting attorneys, to enforce this acknowledged duty. The 
presence of a civil action will allow other resources, neither politically nor 
economically limited, to support animals in asserting their interests. The duty 
exists presently; it is a matter of how the legal system will impose obligations 
in light of this duty. While building on the existence of this duty, this proposal 
rejects the legislative exemptions created in the criminal law, seeking a re-
balancing of animal and human interests under the structure of the proposed 
tort.78 
B. Presence of a Fundamental Interest 
The proposed tort first requires the presence of a fundamental interest. 
All living beings have interests: biological, physiological, social and 
nutritional needs, of which an individual may or may not be self-aware. While 
the injured person, and its primary purpose is to compensate for the damage suffered, 
at the expense of the wrongdoer. If successful, the plaintiff receives a judgment for 
a sum of money, enforceable against the defendant. The state never can sue in tort 
in its political or governmental capacity. 
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 7. 
78. Most state anti-cruelty statutes exempt a number of general activities from the scope 
of the law. If any particular act can be shown to have been carried out under the umbrella of 
a specified general activity, then it is exempted regardless of the intention of the actor or degree 
of cruelty involved. For example, the Michigan law MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 750.50 provides in 
relevant part: 
8) This section does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of an animal, 
including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) Fishing. 
(b) Hunting, trapping, or wildlife control regulated pursuant to the natural resources 
and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.101 to 324.90106. 
(c) Horse racing. 
(d) The operation of a zoological park or aquarium. 
(e) Pest or rodent control. 
(f) Farming or a generally accepted animal husbandry or farming practice involving 
livestock. 
(g) Activities authorized pursuant to rules promulgated under section 9 of the 
executive organization act of 1965, 1965 PA 380, MCL 16.109. 
(h) Scientific research pursuant to 1969 PA 224, MCL 287.381 to 287.395. 
(i) Scientific research pursuant to sections 2226, 2671, 2676, and 7333 of the public 
health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.2226,333.2671,333.2676, and 333.7333. 
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the interest in eating an apple pie may be trivial, others are more fundamental, 
such as a freedom from pain and suffering and personal freedom of 
movement. 79 We are dependant upon the advances of scientific study to bring 
before the court the information necessary to decide what interests a particular 
animal may have. While most of the information can be provided on a species 
basis, some information may be unique to the individual animal. Obviously 
the test cannot be whether humans know everything about a species, as we do 
not yet even know everything about ourselves. Sufficiency of knowledge 
should be judged in the context of the specific interests at issue before a court. 
Satisfying the court as to the base of information is the plaintiff's burden. An 
issue, such as the appropriate home for the placement of a pet, may be highly 
dependent on the character of the individual animal and only modestly 
dependent on information about the species generally. On the other hand, the 
basic housing square footage need for a tiger in a zoo is most likely satisfied 
by species information, rather than individual animal information. 
The extent of expert information needed by a court relates to the degree 
to which the issue reflects new ideas, or ideas not commonly understood. 
Some issues, such as the general need for clean water and nutritional food, can 
be presumed to be generally understood, but if the specific food for the feeding 
of a snake is at issue, then some expert will be required to present information 
to the court. 80 
Only interests of fundamental importance to the animal should be before 
the court, as opposed to the trivial or obscure interests of the animal. This is 
required by both the reality of limited judicial resources and the political 
support that will be necessary to sustain the new tort. For the most part, these 
interests should also be capable of ready scientific support. This is not a bright 
line test and obviously will force the court to make a judgment call. The term 
"fundamental" should be considered in light of our knowledge of what is 
important to an animal as a species and as an individual. Fundamental 
interests reflect those needs or characteristics of an individual animal which 
are required for the physical and mental well being of the animal, and will 
79. !d. Roscoe Pound lists five categories offundamental human interests: 
I. The physical person 
2. Freedom of will 
3. Honor and reputation 
4. Privacy and sensibilities 
5. Belief and opinion 
3 POUND, supra note 13, at 33. Pound discusses these categories at length. See id. at 33-105. 
80. For many issues this will only need to be done once. As courts make factual 
determinations, subsequent courts will be able to rely upon that information without full 
litigation with experts. For example, the proposition that primates are social creatures that need 
or prefer group living arrangements could be so established. 
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normally be reflected in providing those environmental conditions which are 
necessary to allow the animal to exercise and experience those characteristics 
or activities that are species defining. For example, to be housed in social 
groupings is fundamental to primates, but most likely not to snakes; to be able 
to reproduce is fundamental to all living beings; to be able to sustain life with 
water and food is fundamental; to be able to use one's body in modes for 
which it is built is fundamental to all life. Birds need perches and the space in 
which to fly, while rabbits do not. Cheetahs need space to run, frogs need 
ponds in which to lay eggs. Some lizards need walls to climb and places to 
hide. Boa constrictors need branches to lie out upon, and drop down from. 
Hogs need space to root and wallow. Sheep need space to sit in social groups 
and chew their cud. Each species has developed characteristics by which they 
survive and reproduce. Humans have removed many of them from the 
environment in which they would normally exist. One of the moral duties that 
arises out of this taking of possession and control of an animal is the obligation 
to provide the animal those conditions that are fundamental to the animal's 
nature. 
This does not have to be a search without landmarks. The criminal anti-
cruelty laws and the A W A, discussed earlier, can act as a rich set of markers, 
already adopted by the legislature and administrative agencies as reflecting 
concern for fundamental interests. However, the adopted regulations do not 
necessarily protect an animal's fundamental interest. Surely we know enough 
about chimpanzees to be comfortable in stating that keeping a chimpanzee in 
a 5 X 5 X 7 cage is an interference with its fundamental interest.81 
If we cannot say what is fundamental to an animal, then the doors of the 
courtroom will remain closed until such information is available. While this 
may seem unfair, there is no other way to proceed, given the limited resources 
of the legal system. A court cannot be asked to do the science; it can only be 
asked to weigh the information science provides. For many of the species 
around us on a daily basis, this portion of the test will not be the difficult one, 
while in other instances, the balancing of interests will provide a unique 
challenge. 
81. See generally JANE GOODAll, CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 
(1986) (documenting chimpanzee behavior); Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral 
and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REv. 163 (2001) (providing 
information on mental abilities of great apes). Admittedly these issue are complex, see 
HOUSING, CARE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELLBEING OF CAPTIVE LABORATORY PRIMATES, supra 
note 50, but the cage sizes contained in the existing regulations, 9 C.F.R. 3.75 (2004), are more 
reflective of prior laboratory capital investment than of a determination of fundamental interest 
of chimpanzees. 
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C. Intention of the Defendant 
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff must show that the defendant is the 
source of actions causing interference with the plaintiffs interest. This is 
fundamental to common law tort actions, and the usual concepts and theories 
would apply in this circumstance as well. 82 An important issue when focusing 
on the actions of the defendant is the issue of intentionality. Most interest 
interferences within the scope of this tort will not be one time events like 
battery or publication of libel, but are ongoing conditions imposed by the 
owner/possessor upon an animal. The level of intention necessary for a 
violation of the tort is that the act (or failure to act) must be shown to have 
been intended by the defendant, whether or not the specific consequence was 
intended. As a matter of public policy, if an individual has possession of an 
animal, it should be presumed that he or she understands the animal's and the 
species's fundamental interests, and is willing and able to accommodate them. 
In the prior example, Big Joe has single caged and mis-fed JoJo. His acts are 
intentional; the court may conclusively presume that he understood the 
consequences of his actions upon JoJo. Likewise, Big University, by 
intentionally placing JoJo in a cage, would be presumed to understand that 
such conditions interfered with a fundamental interest. 
D. The Test of Substantially Outweighs 
While in the realm of philosophy it may be possible to argue that the 
interests of animals are equal to that of humans, in the realm of law it is not 
currently possible. New law is built on compromise and incremental change. 
The shifting of individuals' expectations causes society to evolve. Admittedly, 
this new tort will bring new, conflicting public policy questions before the 
courts, and the courts should act only when the moral balance is clearly in 
favor of the animal. To do otherwise would undermine the public's confidence 
in the right of courts to address these novel issues. It will also allow for a shift 
of perspective and expectation to occur in the minds of the general public. The 
policy discussion of the courts will become increasingly vital, complex and 
compelling as information is provided and public policy is developed. 83 
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 2, 3 (1965) (defining "Acts" and 
"Actor"); PROSSER supra note 2, at§ 26. 
83. 
The administration of the law becomes a process of weighing the interests for which 
the plaintiff demands protection against the defendant's claim to untranuneled 
freedom in the furtherance of defendant's desires, together with the importance of 
those desires themselves. When the interest of the public is thrown into the scales 
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The burden is on the plaintiff to show that his interests "substantially 
outweigh" those of the defendant. Presumably, the plaintiff will initially be 
required to show a prima facie case of substantially outweighing, whereupon 
the defendant would have the option of making an affirmative showing ofhis 
or her interests.84 In the second of the JoJo examples, JoJo's counsel would 
need to show, through the use of expert witnesses, that the physical living 
conditions, nutrition and psychological abuse were interfering with JoJo's 
fundamental interests. The plaintiff would then argue that the defendant's 
interests do not substantially outweigh his or her own. The defendant would 
have the opportunity both to show the court, as an affirmative defense, the 
scope and depth of his or her need to engage in the complained of conduct, as 
well as to contest the characterization of the conduct itself. In the context of 
the second example, a court should be willing to find a violation of the 
proposed tort. 
The third example with JoJo is more difficult because broader social 
interests are involved. In this example, the issue will be whether the possible 
advancement of science through specific experimentation will is substantially 
outweighed by the degree of interference with the plaintif£ Presumably, the 
defendant would assert that a broader public good was being served by the use 
of the animal in the proposed experiment. If the institution has no planned use 
for the specific animal and is simply housing it, the interference would likely 
be without justification. 
In both of the examples, a court might also consider what alternatives 
exist for advancing the human interests raised by the defendant as justifying 
the proposed action. Alternatives fulfilling at least a portion of the human 
and allowed to swing the balance for or against the plaintiff, the result is a form of 
"social engineering." A decision maker might deliberately seek to use the law as an 
instrument to promote the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," or instead 
might give greater emphasis to protecting certain types of interests of individuals as 
fundamental entitlements central to an integrity of person that the law upholds above 
all else. This process of weighing the interests is by no means peculiar to the law of 
torts, but it has been carried to its greatest lengths and has received its most general 
conscious recognition in this field. 
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 16-17. The realityofthe need to balance the interests of animals with 
those of humans was noted by one of the first animal rights advocates, Henry Salt. "Once more 
then, animals have rights, and these rights consist in the 'restricted freedom' to live a natural 
life-a life, that is, which permits of the individual development-subject to the limitations 
imposed by the permanent needs and interests of the community." SALT, supra note 3, at 22. 
84. As in the situation of a bailment where a plaintiff bailor has the duty to show 
negligence on the part of the defendant bailee, since the defendant has the best information 
about what happened to the bailed item, the plaintiff's showing is prima facie, and the 
expectation is that the defendant will affirmatively defend with more information than the 
plaintiff might have possessed. See Gebert v. Yank, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
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interest, without imposing a substantial interference with the plaintiff's 
interests, could be weighed in the court's balancing. In the case of Mr. Jones, 
there are many different courses of conduct which may allow him to realize 
notoriety and ego gratification. However, depending on what information is 
sought by the science experiment in the third example, the number of 
alternatives may be restricted. If the plaintiff can convince the court that viable 
alternatives exist, then the court can consider this in the balancing of interests. 
Alternatively, the court might find that what is sought in a particular 
experiment by a particular person is neither of sufficient public concern nor 
justified, or that while a chimpanzee may be necessary for the experiment, the 
best possible outcome would be of such trivial value to science and the public 
that any interference with a fundamental interest may negate the justification 
for the experiment. Thus, when a public good is involved, there are two types 
of questions that may be addressed. First, is the plaintiff in question necessary 
to the desired outcome? Second, is the desired outcome important from a 
social, cultural or scientific perspective? What if Mr. Jones sought to advance 
science by dissecting JoJo in order to determine how the arteries supply blood 
to a chimpanzee's heart? Clearly a chimpanzee is necessary to this outcome. 
But even though Mr. Jones may think this information necessary, others may 
have already obtained it, or it may be obtained without any cutting of tissue 
through the use of advanced imaging technology. Even though Mr. Jones does 
not have access to the technology, the courts could well judge that whatever 
social or scientific interests may exist in the information can be obtained by 
others without interference with a fundamental right, thus allowing the court 
to deny Mr. Jones his interests. So again, the plaintiff may counter the claims 
of the "weight" of the defendant's action-when a public good is asserted-by 
showing that society at large neither needs nor values the outcome asserted. 
All of this calls upon a judge to weigh disparate interests. Undoubtedly, 
issues of morality, money, fairness and social policy will be intermixed. This 
difficulty is precisely why it is important to engage the courts in the debate 
about the use of animals. At the moment, the owner of the animal usually 
makes this decision. There can often be a significant conflict of interests, as 
some owners give no weight to any interests of any animal in their charge. 
Optimum fairness to animals will be obtained when someone other than the 
owner is fully authorized to weigh the benefits, costs and risks of a particular 
act. 85 In so doing, the "property rights" of the owner are being modified. This 
is the transition in which we are currently engaged. Animals are not just 
85. That animals deserve fair treatment is a moral premise that brings animals within 
our legal community to begin with. If society does not accept this premise, that animals deserve 
fair treatment when they are within human control, then society will not accept the 
appropriateness of this proposed tort. 
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property, but a hybrid and owners of animals must adjust their expectations to 
this new reality. Property relationships will continue to be useful for issues of 
clarity about care of an animal, and as the mechanism to transfer value that is 
represented by some animals. 86 However, the paradigm will shift nonetheless. 
E. Loose Strings-Additional Points Before Proceeding 
1. Extent of the Tort-Wild Animals 
There is a set of animals which may need to be set-aside for the moment. 
Individual animals may be divided into two rough categories, those within the 
possession and control of humans (domestic animals) and those that are not 
(wildlife). This article has focused upon those animals that are among us; 
animals for which humans have responsibilities. Indeed, the tort suggested by 
this article arises out of the fact of possession and control. While a tiger in a 
zoo is comparable to a tiger in the wilds of India, the context is not the same. 
Wildlife exist in a different matrix than domestic animals, that of ecology. 
They are a substantial component of the ecological systems of which the earth 
is composed and in which humans exist. They are our ecological brothers and 
sisters, our genetic cousins still living under the rules of evolution. This ought 
to give rise to a more complex ethical consideration. 
While undoubtedly human actions can have significant impact on 
wildlife, it is not clear that the analysis of this article is adequate for the task. 
Wild animals are capable offull existence without the aid of humans. They are 
not the property of humans. 87 The analysis for wildlife is more complex than 
the proposed tort. Perhaps for wildlife, the tort would be framed more along 
the lines of placing the burden on the human to show a substantial human need 
before allowing interference with such wild animals. But this is another 
article. 
86. Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Andell, J., 
concurring) ("Because of the characteristics of animals in general and of domestic pets in 
particular, I consider them to belong to a unique category of'property' that neither statutory law 
nor case law has yet recognized."). 
87. As property laws are a human construct and not an inherent characteristic of 
physical objects, there is always conceptual space for innovation. One of the premises for our 
new property paradigm is that living objects have "self-ownership." That is, unless a human has 
affirmatively asserted lawful dominion and control so as to obtain title to a living object, then 
a living entity will be considered to have self-ownership. Favre, supra note 12, at 479-80. 
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2. Who Will Represent the Animals? 
It is not expected that any animal has the capacity to call a lawyer and 
initiate a lawsuit; this inability is not a bar to the creation of the tort. On a 
regular basis, courts adjudicate issues concerning beings that are 
incapacitated: children, mentally incompetent, the insane, and the aged. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to address who is best able to represent the 
interests of animals before courts. It should be noted that the Uniform Trust 
Act specifically allows for the appointment of a representative. 88 In the notes 
to the Uniform Act, the issue of standing is specifically discussed and it is 
allowed that an interested human has standing to enforce the provisions of the 
Act.89 
The courts are capable of discerning when a particular human is the 
appropriate party to pursue the interests of an animal. In an indirect manner, 
two federal courts have allowed humans to pursue cases that furthered the 
interests of animals covered by federallaw. 90 In at least one case in Florida, 
a court appointed a guardian ad litem for a Chimpanzee Trust.91 The 
development of guidelines for the courts in resolving this issue will 
undoubtedly be the subject of future law review articles. Our legal system has 
a number of mechanisms such as guardianships, next friends, legal 
88. UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 408(b) (2003). 
89. The intended use of a trust authorized by either section may be enforced by a person 
designated in the terms of the trust or, if none, by a person appointed by the court. In either 
case, section II O(b) grants to the person appointed the rights of a qualified beneficiary for the 
purpose of receiving notices and providing consent. If the trust is created for the care of an 
animal, a person with an interest in the welfare of the animal has standing to petition for an 
appointment. The person appointed by the court to enforce the trust should also be a person 
who has exhibited an interest in the animal's welfare. The concept of granting standing to a 
person with a demonstrated interest in the animal's welfare is derived from the Uniform 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in the welfare 
of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or protected person. See, 
e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE§§ 5-21 O(b), 5-414(a) (amended 1993); UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 408. 
90. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that 
one named individual who made a number of visits to a particular chimpanzee in a zoo and 
sought a number of times to pursue administrative remedies on behalf of the chimpanzee had 
standing under the Animal Welfare Act to question the regulations adopted by the government 
agency); Am. Soc 'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey 
Circus, 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding the plaintiff had standing arising out of his 
concern for the well-being of an elephant which he had seen abused while in the employment 
of the defendant and therefore could bring an action under the Endangered Species Act to 
determine if the actions of the defendant had "harmed" the elephant in violation of the law). 
91. In re Fla Chimpanzee Care Trust, No. CP-02-1333- IY (Prob. Div. Palm Beach 
County Cir. Ct., Apr. I, 2002). 
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representatives and social workers to deal with this issue.92 This is a 
procedural issue and while in need of scholarly consideration, is not a bar to 
the adoption of the substantive tort. 
3. Death for the Benefit of Humans 
One of the most fundamental conflicts that the courts will have to face 
under this tort analysis is the balance of animals' interest in continued life as 
weighed against the interests of humans in the use of the body or body parts 
after the death of the animal. Given the number of animals that are part of 
commercial food industry, it is fair to say that most domestic animals exist 
only because their bodies are a desired commercial product. Obviously all 
animals will die at some point. After death, the interest of the individual 
animal is gone, and the interest of the human owner becomes paramount. The 
human may bury the body, cremate it, eat the meat, or use the fur. 
One of the most difficult ethical issues this society faces is whether it is 
appropriate to bring animals into existence under the assumption of their 
premature death, so that humans may consume the animal's body. If the 
answer to the question is no, then the entire animal food industry must be shut 
down. If the answer is yes, then surely there must be considerable focus upon 
the quality of life and the process of death for such animals. Additionally, 
there should be analysis about which human interests justify early death. This 
is separate from issues that relate to quality of life or how death is inflicted. 
The fundamental question the courts will address is whether human 
interests can ever justify taking an animal's life. Do an individual animal's 
interests to continued life trump any human interests that could be put forth? 
Under one scenario, an animal may have a high quality life, live for years and 
face a painless and unseen death. Clearly there are many individuals who have 
a personal ethical position that suggest early death is never justified by human 
interests. Others see no difficulty in the early death of animals for human 
consumption. 93 
If the present proponents of animal rights can convince broader society 
that animals should not die for the benefit of humans, then that outlook can 
92. See generally Kolber, supra note 81 (arguing that great apes should be allowed 
standing under the A W A). 
93. The issue of how to balance the animal's interest and that of a consuming human 
is considered in a New York Times Magazine article. Michael Polland, An Animal's Place, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Nov. I 0, 2002, at 58. "What's wrong with animal agriculture-with eating 
animals-is the practice, not the principle. What this suggests to me is that people who care 
should be working not for animal rights but animal welfare-to ensure that farm animals don't 
suffer and that their deaths are swift and painless." !d. at II 0. 
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easily be implemented in the application of the test proposed by this article. 
Until that time, it will be understood as a premise of this cause of action that 
human interests can be of sufficient weight to justify the death of an animal. 
But it seems appropriate to say that where the life and premature death of an 
animal is for the benefit of humans, then the quality oflife and nature of death 
deserve enhanced consideration and protection by the courts. 
4. Profit Motive as a Justification 
Another topic adding to the complexity of balancing conflicting interests 
is how to deal with the human desire to make money. Given all the 
alternatives available in this world for making money, that human interest, 
standing alone, should not justify a substantial interference with a fundamental 
interest. For example, ifBig Jones bought JoJo with the intention of displaying 
him in his hardware store to increase customer visits, and then to use him in 
human-chimp wrestling matches on the weekend, the primary motivation for 
ownership is profit. Assuming the living conditions violate JoJo's 
fundamental interest, then the third prong of the test will be satisfied and JoJo 
will win, as Big Jones's desire for profit is of insufficient weight to justify the 
impact on JoJo's fundamental interest. 
Another aspect to profit is seeking to increase or enhance profitability in 
a way that increases the harm to an animal. In deciding whether consumption 
of pig products is an acceptable use of pigs, the fact that, under our capitalist 
system, someone will profit in providing the product, should not weigh in the 
balance. Assume that the judgment is to allow pig products. Then the 
question turns to the issue ofhow pigs are raised. When pig producers' desire 
to enhance profits or gain a competitive advantage in raising pigs results in an 
interference with a fundamental right, such actions should not be allowed. It 
is possible to raise pigs in a manner that does not violate their fundamental 
interest. Unfortunately, in the capitalist system, the motivation to enhance 
profits by decreasing cost is a powerful force. However, it is an objectionable 
force when the conditions in which animals are raised substantially interfere 
with a fundamental right. 
As one narrow hypothetical, consider a producer ofhogs who has 1,000 
hogs in one building. The accountant figures out that if they lower the 
temperature in the building during winter by five degrees, they will lose fifty 
hogs to exposure, as well as some loss of poundage in hogs because of 
constant shivering. However, these financial losses are offset by the money 
saved from a reduction in fuel cost. This action should not be allowed, as 
enhancing profit is not such an interest as will justify the interference with 
fundamental rights. 
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5. Remedies 
Three remedies shall be available for violation of this tort: money 
damages, injunctive relief and title transfer. The expected remedy for 
violation of an ordinary tort is money damages of a sufficient amount to "make 
the plaintiff whole." Damages should also be available under this tort; that 
level of money necessary to eliminate the interference with a fundamental 
right. If pain and suffering has been a part of the experience of the plaintiff 
then, as with humans, some compensation is appropriate, perhaps within the 
context of money sufficient to assure the conditions do not reoccur. As for 
money damages awarded, the money would need to be put into a trust arranged 
by a court appointed trustee who would be under the obligation to expend the 
money for the benefit and well being of the animal in question. 
The remedy that will be most useful in many circumstances is injunctive 
relief. While an injunction is somewhat unusual for torts, it is available when 
an ongoing tort exists.94 Like the factory that continues to bleach out toxic 
gases and hot cinders onto a neighbor, money damages would be appropriate 
for harm to date, but an injunction to shut down the ongoing source of 
pollution would also be available to the plaintiff. 
Most unusual for an action in tort is a remedy allowing the court to force 
the transfer of title of the property to another. In those circumstances, when 
a violation of the tort has been shown, and the defendant is an owner of the 
plaintiff, then the court is empowered to force the transfer of the title from the 
defendant to a new owner. In the prior examples, it is unlikely Mr. Jones has 
the financial capacity to provide for JoJo and therefore transfer of title might 
be an appropriate remedy. Big University could well have adequate resources 
to meet the fundamental interests of JoJo, and all that would be required is an 
injunction with direction to modify the environmental conditions of the 
animal. The key point is that if a violation of the tort is found by the court, the 
animal should not be forced to remain in such conditions. And if the 
defendant is unable to provide the resources necessary, the plaintiff should be 
transferred to someone who can provide the appropriate resources. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has established that animals presently have some of their 
interests represented within our legal system. Building upon this premise, a 
new approach has been suggested by which civil tort laws could be expanded 
94. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 640-43 (discussing injunctive relief being available 
for a continuing nuisance). 
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to include a new tort which would directly balance the fundamental interests 
of animals with those of humans. This would bring to the forefront a process 
that has long existed, allowing public policy to be more forthrightly considered 
and decided. It will, in fact, provide a legal mechanism to realize our moral 
obligations to the domestic animals that are among us. 
HeinOnline -- 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 368 2005
